Premature Probate: A Different Perspective On Guardianship for the Elderly by Alexander, George J.
Santa Clara Law
Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1979
Premature Probate: A Different Perspective On
Guardianship for the Elderly
George J. Alexander
Santa Clara University School of Law, gjalexander@scu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Automated Citation
George J. Alexander, Premature Probate: A Different Perspective On Guardianship for the Elderly , 31 Stan. L. Rev. 1003 (1979),
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/647
Premature Probate: A Different
Perspective on Guardianship for the
Elderly
George J. Alexander*
The management of an individual's property and health is, in
large part, left to that person's discretion. The law considers most
people competent to make the necessary decisions in these areas.
However, for those who lack that competence, largely the elderly,'
the law provides for the imposition of surrogate management in the
form of guardianship or its equivalent. 2 Yet the substitution of a
guardian's judgment as to what is best for the ward's health or prop-
erty creates a grievious potential for abuse.
The guardian may make health treatment decisions for the ward
which are contrary to the ward's wishes. For example, the guardian
may hospitalize the ward for the ward's "protection." The hospital
* A.B. 1953,J.D. 1959, University of Pennsylvania; LL.M. 1964, J.S.D. 1969, Yale Law
School. Dean and Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara Law School. The author
wishes to acknowledge the contributions of his research assistants, Barbara J. Nelson and
Daniel M. Wall, and the aid of Lynne N. Henderson, and thanks them for their extraordinary
help and thoughtful criticism.
On April 23 and 24, 1979, the author chaired the Task Force on Protecting Human
Rights, at the National Conference on Mental Health and the Elderly held by the United
States House of Representatives Select Committee on Aging. The staff of the Select Commit-
tee circulated a prior draft of this article to the Task Force which then recommended that
"appropriate legislative bodies. . . provide for legislative implementation of the right of indi-
viduals to file binding statements, while competent, to govern disposition of their person and
property during incompetency." The proposal was unanimously accepted by the Conference.
1. One study showed that 80% of the persons placed under guardianship in the Los
Angeles County central district from July 1, 1973 to June 30, 1974 were over 65. See National
Senior Citizens Center, Empirical Study of Guardianship and Conservatorship Filings in Los
Angeles County (1977) (unpublished data on file with author) [hereinafter cited as Senior
Center Study]. This study, conducted by the National Senior Citizens Center, a federally
funded legal services center concerned with the legal problems of the elderly poor, included
examination of 1,010 cases filed under CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1460-1470 (West 1956)
(amended 1959, 1976, 1978), and id §§ 1701-2207 (West Supp. 1979) in the Los Angeles
County central district.
2. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1460-1463, 1701-2207 (West Supp. 1979).
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may use a form of treatment, such as electroconvulsive therapy,
which the ward may particularly fear. Or the guardian may invol-
untarily commit the ward to an institution if the guardian feels the
ward is suicidal or dangerous to others.
The guardian may also deny the ward the benefit of possessions
or savings, or require the ward to receive those benefits as a dole from
an appointed manager. The guardian may manage the property in a
way that channels funds away from individuals the ward would like
to benefit, and toward persons the guardian prefers. Alternatively,
the guardian may restrict the ward's expenses with an eye to enlarg-
ing the estate that will pass on death.
Since the law conceives of surrogate management as a benefit to
the ward, the law imposes such management in a nonadversary set-
ting. Consequently, claims to the ward's property are not openly
raised and adjudicated, but instead are subsumed in litigation on the
single issue of the ward's competence.3 Moreover, although the im-
portance of benefit to the ward in the competency determination
causes that proceeding to become laden with a concern for due proc-
ess--on the assumption that such procedures will guarantee fair-
ness-that guarantee is uncertain, and shocking inequities often
come to light.
Although guardianship of property and health have much in
common, the two forms of surrogate management raise different
problems. In Part I of this article, I consider the problems attending
guardianship of property, and examine the approaches used to pro-
tect the ward's property interest. I conclude that the "living will"
suggested by probate law provides the best substitute for the present
model of guardianship. In Part II, I look at the problems raised by
the surrogate management of health needs-principally the excessive
use of involuntary commitment-and I conclude that a living will
also allows individuals to control their treatment in the event of incom-
petence.
3. See, e.g., id §§ 1460-1461. "In most jurisdictions, the petition [for guardianship] may
be filed by either the disabled person or by one or more of his friends or relatives." Rohan,
Caingfor Persons Under a Disability: A Criique of the Role of the Conserator and the "Substitution of
Judgment Doctrine" 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1, 6 (1977). Moreover, "[s]everal jurisdictions im-
pose the additional rea~irement that notice be furnished to the spouse, 'descendants, as-
cendants and next of kin' of the proposed conservatee," id., thus including in the proceedings
the vast majority of potential heirs.
1004 [Vol. 31:1003
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I. THE LIVING WILL AND SURROGATE MANAGEMENT OF
PROPERTY
The fall of a wealthy man demonstrates the scope of possible per-
sonal tragedy inherent in a guardianship proceeding.' Ben Weingart
was ordered into conservatorship, the rough equivalent of guardian-
ship, in October 1974.5 At that time, he appeared to own property
valued at about one-half billion dollars.6 The petition for surrogate
management alleged that he was likely to be imposed on by "artful
and designing" persons, naming the woman with whom he had lived
for 16 years.7 The petitioners, who would become the managers of
Mr. Weingart's property, were personally indebted to him for sub-
4. Shakespeare often wrote about the tragedies of kings rather than of common folk.
"The pangs of despised love and the anguish of remorse, we say, are the same in a peasant
and a prince; but. . . the story of the prince, the triumvir, or the general, has a greatness and
dignity of its own .... [W]hen he falls suddenly from the height of earthly greatness to the
dust, his fall produces a sense of contrast, of the powerlessness of man, and of the omnipo-
tence-perhaps the caprice--of Fortune or Fate, which no tale of private life can possibly
rival." Bradley, The Substance of Shakespearean Tragedy, in APPROACHES TO SHAKESPEARE 1,
5-6 (N. Rabin ed. 1964).
But most guardianship proceedings do not concern the wealthy. See G. ALEXANDER &
T. LEWIN, THE AGED AND THE NEED FOR SURROGATE MANAGEMENT 71-72, 159 (1972)
(table 5). Information from Onondaga County, New York records revealed that the total
average estate involved in guardianship proceedings was approximately $24,000. Id. The
vast majority of petitions for guardianship, those concerning state hospital patients, involved
an average estate of approximately $19,000. Id. And guardianship proceedings sometimes
involve only the right to make decisions about publicly provided benefits. "IT]he incompe-
tent poor have almost as many meaningful decisions to be made for them as have incompe-
tents with property." Zicklin & Libow, The Penultimate Will, 47 N.Y. ST. B.J. 31, 32 (1975).
Studies in California and New York revealed that a state hospital was the petitioner for an
adjudication of incompetency in a vast majority of the cases examined. See G. ALEXANDER &
T. LEWIN, supra, at 12; Senior Center Study, supira note 1. State hospitals institute such pro-
ceedings to secure reimbursement for the costs of care, maintenance, and medical treatment
of the patient. G. ALEXANDER & T. LEWIN, sufira, at 67-69; see OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, STATE OF NEW YORK, HANDBOOK OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMITTEES OF PA-
TIENTS OF STATE INSTITUTIONS (1968). Regardless of the theoretical solicitude of the law
toward small estates, those persons classed as relatively indigent are not accorded the same
procedural opportunities and safeguards as their more affluent counterparts. See Senior
Center Study, supra note 1.
5. In re Weingart, No. P-607498 (Super. Ct. Prob. Div. L.A. County, Cal. Oct. 29, 1974);
see Hamill, For the Ben Weingarls, There Oughtta Be a Law, L.A. Herald Examiner, Jan. 10,
1979, § A, at 3, col. 1; Hamill, The 'Cinderella' Who LovedBen Weingart, id., Jan. 8, 1979, § A, at
3, col. 1; Hamill, Ben Weingart: Rags to Riches... Back to Rags, id., Jan. 5, 1979, § A, at 3, col.
1; Hamill, Thq Spokefor His Money, Not Him, id., Jan. 3, 1979, § A, at 3, col. 1; Hamill, T coon's
Millions Began with 35e Loan, id., Dec. 31, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 1; Hamill, Her Fight Over a
7'coon's Millions, id., Dec. 29, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 1.
6. Hamill, Her Fight Over a T.ycoon's Millions, supra note 5, at 3.
7. Mr. Weingart's generosity to his cohabitant, Laura Winston, precipitated the conser-
vatorship proceedings. Eight days prior to the institution of the proceedings, Ben Weingart
tried to increase the corpus of a trust he had set up for Laura Winston from $1 million to $2
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stantial amounts of money."
The court declared a temporary conservatorship in October
1974,1 and permanent conservatorship that November. 0 Mr. Wein-
gart was present at neither proceeding.I' To excuse his absence, the
petitioners presented the court with a medical certificate stating that
Mr. Weingart had a moderately severe organic brain syndrome and
was, for that reason, not able to attend the hearing.'2 Once ap-
pointed, the managers stopped all payments to the woman who had
been living with Mr. Weingart and barred her from seeing him. 13
They also transferred substantial sums of money from their control as
conservators-subject to conservatorship accounting to the court-to
a trust of which they were trustees.' 4
The story of Ben Weingart abounds in procedural unfairness,
hidden conflicts of interests, and tragic disregard for the wishes of the
ward. Those who, unlike Mr. Weingart, escape surrogate manage-
ment, ultimately dispose of all of their property through probate.
Both surrogate management and probate principally affect the eld-
erly. Both processes often benefit spouses and children-surrogate
management by conserving property so that it might later pass to
these heirs through probate, and by sometimes increasing the al-
lowances given to them during the ward's life. But unlike probate,
surrogate management denies the ward the right to determine the
use of property, since it does not follow the ward's previously ex-
pressed intent. I argue in this part that even though guardianship
proceedings have been conducted with an increasing regard for pro-
cedural due process, they fail to protect the ward's property interests.
I suggest that better results are possible by substituting probate for
the present model of guardianship. Such a change would stress cer-
tainty of result, and shift the focus from what is "best" for the ward
to implementation of the ward's previously stated objectives as ex-
pressed in a "living will."
million. The petitioners for conservatorship alleged that Ms. Winston coerced Mr. Wein-
gart's attempt. Ste Hamill, The Ct'nderella' Who Loved Ben Weingart, supra note 5.
8. Hamill, Her Aiht Over a Tycoon' Millions, supra note 5, at 3.
9. Id. at 1.
10. Id. at 1, 3.
11. Id. at 1.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 3.
14. Id.
1006 [Vol. 31:1003
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A. Inadequacy of Present Guardianship Law
A court imposes guardianship 5 on individuals when it finds that
they are unable to care properly for themselves. 16 When a court
makes such a determination, it may then appoint a guardian to care
for the ward's health. 7 The same guardian, or another court ap-
pointee, may assume management control of the ward's property. 8
Both health and property guardianships label the ward as unable to
manage,' 9 and substitute a surrogate to act in the ward's best inter-
ests.2' But because of broadly drawn standards of incompetence and
illusory procedural safeguards in guardianship statutes, courts fre-
quently find an individual incompetent and appoint a guardian
where the alleged incompetent is still capable of managing property.
And even where a ward is incompetent and does require a guardian,
present guardianship statutes do not ensure that the guardian will
manage the ward's property in accordance with the ward's wishes.
Nor do these statutes ensure that the court will recognize the conflict
of interests between the petitioners and the ward. In this section I
examine these inadequacies of guardianship statutes.
15. The history of guardianship is closely linked to the law of insanity. If insane, an
individual could be deprived of various rights, including those of property management,
through guardianship proceedings. See Horstman, Protective Serices for the Elderly: The Limits of
Parens Patriae, 40 Mo. L. REv. 215, 218-19 (1975); Regan, Protective Serices for the Eldery:
Commitment, Guardianship, and Alternatives, 13 Wat. & MARY L. REV. 569, 570-73 (1972). A
later statutory distinction between old age and insanity showed that many legislatures be-
lieved that aging itself might bring about functional disabilities creating property manage-
ment problems. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1435.2 (West 1956) (amended 1976) (word
incompetent defined to include "insanity as well as incompetency arising by reason of old age,
disease, weakness of mind, or other cause rendering a person unable, unassisted, properly to
manage and take care of himself or his property").
In some states, separate provisions exist for the management of the insane--or mentally
ill-and of those incompetent by reason of functional disability not traceable to mental ill-
ness. The older practice of treating the groups alike was known as guardianship. See, e.g., id.
§§ 1435.2, 1460-1462 (amended 1959, 1976, 1977, 1978). The newer process of conservator-
ship, used for the surrogate management of those incompetent by reason of functional disabil-
ity, is intended to recognize the difference between insanity and disfunction. See, e.g., id.
§§ 1701-2201 (West Supp. 1979). See generaly G. ALEXANDER & T. LEWIN, supra note 4, at
81-124. Since the two terms have become confused, this article will refer to the two processes
as guardianship.
16. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 1435.2 (West Supp. 1979). While this standard may seem
overly vague, it is common in the statutes.
17. Id. § 1460 ("Any superior court to which application is made. . . may appoint a
guardian for the person and estate or person or estate of an incompetent person. . . '2). For
further discussion of the surrogate management of health needs, see notes 92-123 infra and
accompanying text.
18. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1460, 1500 (West Supp. 1979).
19. See id. §§ 1435.2, 1460.
20. Id. §§ 1460, 1500.
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1. Adjudicating incompetency.
8roadly drawn standards of incompetence. The California Probate
Code under which In re Weingart was tried,2' like the current probate
statutes of many other states, allowed surrogate managers to be ap-
pointed on the basis of broadly drawn standards of incompetence.22
The standards used in these current statutes, like the standards in the
California statute prior to its amendment, presumably reflect a belief
that the guardianship process principally benefits the ward. The spe-
21. The California law of guardianship was revised after In re Weingart. While the old
law allowed a court to appoint a conservator based on broadly drawn standards of incompe-
tence, the new law focuses on the ward's ability to function. Compare CAL. PROB. CODE
§§ 1435.2, 1460 (West 1956) (amended 1976) (incompetency can arise "by reason of old age,
disease, weakness of mind, or other cause rendering a person unable, unassisted, properly to
manage and take care of himself or his property") with id. (West Supp. 1979) (person incom-
petent when "unable properly to provide for his own personal needs for physical health, food,
clothing or shelter, and . ..substantially unable to manage his own financial resources").
The new law also no longer allows a court to appoint a conservator for individuals unable to
resist "artful and designing" persons, but instead only directs that courts be concerned about
whether the ward is capable of resisting "undue influence." Compare id §§ 1460, 1751 (West
1956 & Supp. 1975) (amended 1976) with id. (West Supp. 1979). Moreover, while under the
old law courts often considered emotional or psychological instability as valid reasons for the
alleged incompetent's absence from the court proceeding, see notes 29-30 infia and accompa-
nying text, the new law provides that these are not valid reasons in most instances, see CAL.
PROB. CODE § 1461 (West Supp. 1979) (absence permitted only if "attendance at the hearing
is likely to cause serious and immediate physiological damage"). Ifa potential ward's absence
is excused, the court must send an official to the potential ward to explain his or her rights.
Id. §§ 1461.1, .5; see id. § 1461 (official must explain to potentially incompetent person "that
he shall have the right to legal counsel of his own choosing, including the right to have legal
counsel appointed for him by the court if he is unable to retain one"). The new law strength-
ens the provision for representation by counsel, see id. § 1461.5, makes counsel more readily
available, see id. (court may appoint attorney if alleged incompetent does not have attorney),
and provides for automatic periodic review by court investigators, see id. § 1500.1 (1 year after
inception of guardianship and bienially thereafter). These new provisions combine a concern
for due process in the determination of incompetence with a direction that the court hear the
potential ward.
Because of the breadth of discretion allowed by the statute, however, the statute is less
effective than it appears on its face. In a case tried by the author under the new law, the trial
judge, the Honorable Gerald E. Regan, refused to hear closing argument explaining the new
law or applying it to the facts. Disregarding a trial memorandum referring to the new provi-
sions, he found the ward to be susceptible to "artful and designing" persons. Told that this
standard was no longer used in the law, the judge instead considered the ward's ability to
manage property. Upon asking the conservator whether the ward met the statutory standard
of competence and getting a simple "no" in reply, the judge continued the conservatorship.
The same judge controlled the appointment of counsel for trial and for any possible appeal.
In re Blatteis, No. 58476 (Super. Ct. San Mateo County, Cal. Nov. 17, 1977); see Guardian-
ship of Boxley, 115 Cal. App. 2d 483, 486; 252 P.2d 348, 350 (2d Dist. 1953) (incompetent
may not contract for services of attorney when seeking to remove guardian).
22. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1435.2, 1460 (West 1956) (amended 1976); Regan, supra
note 15, at 603-05.
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cific standards are broad, e.g., "old age," and tend to encourage value
judgments rather than neutral factfinding. For instance, while there
is a good deal of controversy on the relevance of age to disfunction,23
the statutory language allows the trier of fact to stereotypically link
age and incompetence. 24 Similarly, although the elusive concept of
mental illness evokes prejudice among lay persons, 25 the judge or jury
can use mental illness in its most prejudicial sense when it becomes a
reason for supposedly beneficial intervention through guardianship.
23. "[Old] people. . . cannot be judged to be incompetent. They know what they are
doing, . . and [want] to live the way they are living. Still, from our present sociological way
of thinking they need care; some of them their estates, most of them their persons."
McAvinchy, The Aot-Qyite-Inompetent Incompetent, 95 TRUSTS & EST. 872, 873 (1956).
24. See generally T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY (1963).
25. Though there might be some agreement on what constitutes old age, mental illness
is a more shifting concept. "Mental illness is [currently] defined so broadly that every human
being is at times mentally ill." Turner & Carr, Towards an Enlightened Commitment Law, in
Hearngs on Constitutional Rights of the Mental Ill Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Committee on the Judidiag, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 392, 415 (1969-1970). The
edition of AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968) then in effect provided powerful examples of such inclu-
siveness:
"307.4 Adjustment reaction of late life. Example: Feelings of rejection associated with
forced retirement and manifested by social withdrawal.
"301.82 Inadequate personality. This behavior pattern is characterized by ineffectual
responses to emotional, social, intellectual and physical demands. While the patient seems
neither physically nor mentally deficient, he does manifest inadaptability, ineptness, poor
judgment, social instability, and lack of physical and emotional stamina.
"301.6 Asthenic personality. This behavior pattern is characterized by easy fatigabil-
ity, low energy level, lack of enthusiasm, marked incapacity for enjoyment, and oversensitiv-
ity to physical and emotional stress. This disorder must be differentiated from Neurasthenic
neurosis (q.v.).
"301.81 Passive-aggressive personality. This behavior pattern is characterized by both
passivity and aggressiveness. The aggressiveness may be expressed passively, for example by
obstructionism, pouting, procrastination, intentional inefficiency, or stubbornness. This be-
havior commonly reflects hostility which the individual feels he dare not express openly.
Often the behavior is one expression of the patient's resentment at failing to find gratification
in a relationship with an individual or institution upon which he is over-dependent."
Responding, perhaps, to criticism, the A.P.A. has eliminated all but the "passive-aggres-
sive" classification from the latest version of its Manual, see id. (3d ed. 1978), and labelled that
category as "controversial" and subject to future elimination, id. at K:27. However, the mu-
tability of these definitionts underscores the elusiveness of the concept of mental illness. Id.
One commentator has noted the shifting definition of mental illness as illustrated by the
A.P.A.'s changing characterizations of homosexuality. Prior to 1973, he notes, the A.P.A.
"considered homosexuality per se a mental disorder. In that year, by a vote of its member-
ship, the Association decided that homosexuality was not a mental disorder. The nature of
homosexuality did not change, nor were there any startling breakthroughs in the scientific
understanding of homosexual behavior. . . . What changed were the values of a professional
group empowered to affix labels of deviancy." Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science. An
Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 527, 557 (1978).
July 1979] 1009
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I/Iusogyprocedural safeguards. California law, like current statutes in
other jurisdictions, also provided Mr. Weingart with procedural safe-
guards. But, as for most alleged incompetents, these procedural safe-
guards were of no help to Mr. Weingart. For example, the law
specifically provided for his presence at the hearing,26 representation
by counsel to controvert the petition,27 and a judicial determination
of incompetence. 28 But Mr. Weingart did not appear at either of his
two hearings and was not represented by counsel opposing the peti-
tion.29 His case was typical: According to a study by the National
Senior Citizens Center, 93 percent of the respondents were not in
court when their cases were tried.30 Petitioners in each case presuma-
bly presented medical certificates similar to the one filed in In re
Weingart, stating that the respondent was unable to withstand the
rigors of a courtroom proceeding. In a sense, the medical certificate
predetermined a finding of incompetency. The doctor's signature on
a statement that the respondent's debility prevented an appearance
at the hearing provided the first evidence of incompetency for the
trial court. Also, like Mr. Weingart, 97 percent of those in the Na-
tional Senior Citizens Center's study were unrepresented at their
hearings.3 ' It should not be surprising to find that potential wards
who were themselves shunted away from the competency hearing
would allow themselves to go unrepresented as well.
2. Ward's wz'hes and conflicts of interests.
Even where a court properly finds an individual incompetent,
guardianship statutes do not ensure that the guardian will follow the
ward's wishes or that the court will recognize the conflict of interests
between the petitioners and the ward. That the ward earned the
money and owns the property subject to the proceedings, and that
the ward may have definite and competent plans for its disposition,
are of no consequence if the court determines that the ward is pres-
entl' incompetent to manage property. While knowledge of what the
26. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 1461 (West 1956) (amended 1976) (alleged incompetent, "if
able to attend, must be produced at the hearing, and if not able to attend by reason of
physical inability, such inability must be evidenced by the affidavit of a duly licensed physi-
cian or surgeon').
27. Act of Sept. 17, 1973, ch. 546, 1973 Cal. Stat. 1066 (current version at CAL. PROB.
CODE § 1461.5 (West Supp. 1979)).
28. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1460, 1751 (West 1956 & Supp. 1975) (amended 1976).
29. Hamill, For the Ben Wengars, There Oughtla Be a Law, supra note 5.
30. Senior Center Study, supra note 1.
31. Id.
[Vol. 31:1003
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ward would have done when competent may illuminate the question
of what is in the ward's best interest, the guardian and the supervis-
ing court have responsibility for determining how the money is to be
spent.
Moreover, nothing in the typical guardianship proceeding recog-
nizes or addresses the potential conflict of interests between petition-
ers, who may be future beneficiaries of the estate and thus want the
estate preserved, and the potential ward, who may want to spend
money from the estate.3 3 Any one of a large number of persons may
bring a proceeding to examine the competence of a person alleged to
need a guardian.34 The petitioners are typically members of the fam-
ily, or near relatives, who are quite likely to benefit from a guardian-
ship which will preserve assets which can be distributed to them
when the ward dies.35 Several competing beneficiaries may join in
initiating proceedings, agreeing that the estate must be preserved un-
diminished, but expecting later to contest each other's claims.
In fact, the California Probate Code under which Mr. Weingart's
case was tried, like the current probate statutes of many other
states,36 actually encouraged the court to ignore this conflict of inter-
ests between the petitioners and the potential ward, since it allowed
the court to appoint a conservator for those persons who by reason of
old age or other condition were unable to resist "artful and design-
ing" persons.37 While a provision of this nature appears at first blush
to focus on the concern that a debilitated person may be victimized,
the other provisions concerning mismanagement of property would
probably suffice to handle that concern. Instead, the specific refer-
ence to "artful and designing" persons calls the court's attention to
the relationship between the potential ward and the potential ward's
present beneficiaries, and diverts the court's attention from the con-
flict between the potential ward's interests and the interests of the
petitioners.38 Thus, the court in In re Weingart presumably focused its
32. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1500-1607, 1650-1669 (West 1956 & Supp. 1979).
33. See id.; Note, The Disguised Oppression of nvoluntag Guardianshipi: Have the Elderly Free-
dom to Send?, 73 YALE LJ. 676, 676-78 (1964).
34. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1461 (West Supp. 1979); Rohan, supra note 3, at 6.
35. G. ALEXANDER & T. LEWIN, supra note 4, at 71-75.
36. See Alexander, Surrogate Management of the Property of the Aged, 21 SYRAcusE L. REV.
87, 129 (1969).
37. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1435.2, 1460, 1751 (West 1956 &Supp. 1975) (amended 1976).
38. As the author has pointed out elsewhere, the "artful and designing" person language
is a singularly instructive example of a statutory invitation to value judgment. Alexander, On
Being Imposed Upon By Artful and Designing Persons-The California Experience with the Involunta9'
Placement of the Aged, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1083, 1089-90 (1977). The clear focus of the test
July 1979] 1011
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attention on whether Mr. Weingart's younger roommate was "de-
signing," while newspaper reports on the proceedings focused on the
avarice of the petitioners. 9 While both considerations bear on the
potential ward's need for a surrogate manager, the law appears to
exclude from the court's consideration those interests of petitioners
which might conflict with those of the potential ward.
Consequently, it appears that present guardianship law is inade-
quate, both because courts too readily find individuals incompetent,
and because there is no guarantee the ward's wishes will be followed
even if the ward actually is incompetent. In the next section I ex-
plore whether these deficiencies in present guardianship law can be
cured under the due process clause of the 14th amendment.
B. Limits of the Due Process Model
Considering the effect of guardianship on a ward, it seems sur-
prising that there is a dearth of cases holding its invocation unconsti-
tutional.4 ° Two reasons may explain this void. First, the proceedings
have not been viewed as depriving the ward of property; quite to the
is on protecting the potential ward's heirs and keepers from the overreaching of third parties
and, like the pattern of statutory schemes in the guardianship area, on preserving the assets of
the alleged incompetent's estate. Moreover, actual depletion of the estate is not necessary; it
is sufficient that a threat of loss exists. Id. at 1089. Seeking to "protect" the alleged incompe-
tent from the influence of a perceived "artful and designing" person, a judge may place the
ward's estate in the hands of the petitioners, who may or may not protect the interests of the
ward. See, e.g., Guardianship of Estate of Brown, 16 Cal. 3d 359, 546 P.2d 298, 128 Cal. Rptr.
10 (1976). In In re Cassidy's Guardianship, 95 Cal. App. 641, 273 P. 69 (1st Dist. 1928), the
court found that the ward's desire to invest in the building business on assurance of "big
money" available, in spite of inexperience in the building business, together with inability to
carry on a long conversation, formed adequate grounds to appoint a guardian. In In re Ol-
son's Guardianship, 236 Wis. 301, 295 N.W. 24 (1940), the trial court had appointed a guard-
ian for the alleged incompetent solely on the testimony of the petitioner, his niece, in the face
of contrary testimony by those who saw him most frequently. The trial court had stated, "If
[appointment of a guardian] isn't done now, won't it have to be done sometime in the near
future? Probably." Id. at 303, 295 N.W. at 25. The court of appeals reversed, stating" 'Only
with great hesitation should courts, by the appointment of a guardian, interfere with the
discretion of elderly people, owing no legal duty of support to anyone, in devoting the prop-
erty accumulated by them to their comfort according to their own tastes."' Id. at 304-05,
295 N.W. at 26 (quoting In re Guardianship of Warner, 232 Wis. 467, 473, 287 N.W. 803, 805
(1939), which quotes in part In re Guardianship of Welch, 108 Wis. 387, 390, 84 N.W. 550,
551 (1900)). The language of this court is the very point of this article. See In re Lyon, 52
A.D.2d 847, 382 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1976); In re Guardianship of Waite, 14 Cal. 2d 727, 731, 97
P.2d 238, 240 (1939).
39. See note 5 supra.
40. The related question of civil commitment has only recently emerged as one of con-
stitutional importance. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715 (1972); Develoapments in the Law-Civil Commitment ofthe Mental I1, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1190, 1271-1316 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Civil Commitment].
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contrary, they have been seen as preserving the property for the
ward.4" Second, legislation has been altered to provide the kinds of
protection in guardianship proceedings which courts often impose
when they reach constitutional issues affecting individual rights: no-
tice, hearing, and the right to counsel.42 In this section I explore the
constitutionality of surrogate management. Since surrogate manage-
ment can be seen as a deprivation of liberty or property, I consider its
constitutionality under both theories.
1. Surrogate management as a deprivation of proper.
The imposition of surrogate management is probably not an un-
constitutional deprivation of property under the due process clause of
the 14th amendment. In the recent past, the Supreme Court has
given little protection to property interests, in contrast to the consid-
erable protection it has afforded life and liberty interests. At least
since the late 1930s, the Court has accepted a generalized fairness
standard of protection for property interests, while insisting on indi-
vidualized fairness for life and liberty concerns,43 even though the
Constitution speaks equallv of life, liberty, and property as protected
by due process.' Thus, the state may deprive a person of life and
liberty only after a sufficient-and sometimes quite elaborate-indi-
vidualized procedure,45 while courts normally validate states' legisla-
tive determinations as to the disposition of property, even though
they may cause individual hardship, if they are rational and basically
fair to the entire group governed.4 6 Consequently, if surrogate man-
41. The protection of assets is also stressed in state conservatorship laws. Rohan, supra
note 3, at 12.
42. See generally G. ALEXANDER & T. LEWIN, supra note 4; Alexander, supra note 38.
Peter M. Horstman has argued that a full adversary hearing on the issue of incompetency
would provide the protection needed by those facing guardianship. Horstman, supra note 15,
at 231-78. While this protection would be an important step, it suffers from the continuing
possibility that the property owner's will may nonetheless be thwarted, since the ward is
stripped of control of his property once he is adjudged incompetent.
For further discussion of the due process model and its applicability to civil commitment
proceedings, see Task Panel, President's Comm'n on Mental Health, Mental Health and
Human Rights: Report of the Task Panel on Legal and Ethical Issues (Feb. 15, 1978), re-
printed in 20 ARiz. L. REV. 49 (1978); Civil Commitment, supra note 40, at 1271-1316.
43. L. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTuTIONAL LAw 413-70, 564-72 (1978).
44. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
45. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
46. Justice Black accurately summarized this development in his opinion for the Court
in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963): "Under the system of government created by our
Constitution, it is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legisla-
tion. There was a time when the Due Process Clause was used by this Court to strike down
laws which were thought unreasonable, that is, unwise or incompatible with some particular
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agement is characterized as a deprivation of property, courts will
probably hold that it is constitutionally permissible, even without the
same procedural safeguards provided in a criminal trial. The state
need merely adopt a general scheme of guardianship which ration-
ally balances competing economic considerations.
2. Surrogate management as a deprivation of lzfe/liberty.
But even the life/liberty due process model, with its individual-
izedjustice, cannot ensure fairness in guardianship proceedings, since
its standard is uncertain and totally dependent on procedural vindica-
economic or social philosophy. . . . The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage [and]
Adin~s. . . has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional
proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of
legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws." Id at 729-30.
To be sure, the Supreme Court once took a more protective view of property interests.
See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Presently, however, the property interests
that are protected tend to be interests of the "new" rather than the "old" property, where the
focus is not so much on the thing owned as on the owner. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); Reich, The New Properly, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Thus, welfare entitlements may be
protected because of the desperate needs of the recipients. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at
261-64. Debtors may be protected against seizure of their property by creditors, presumably
because debtors, also, are uniquely vulnerable as a group. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972). Accused violators of trade ethics are protected from the power of their accusers not
because their interests sound in property, but because they are relatively helpless. See Silver
v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
It is difficult to state a litmus test to distinguish between property and life/liberty inter-
ests, since many economic relationships affect basic personal liberties, and liberty has an eco-
nomic component. Further, the present dichotomy may not properly represent the original
rationale behind the distinction. Chief Justice Stone's famous footnote in United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), introduced the dichotomy: "There may be nar-
rower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on
its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Four-
teenth ...
"It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is
to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Four-
teenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation." Id at 152 n.4 (citations omit-
ted).
Stone's point was to distinguish between rights which legislatures would likely champion
because they affect a significant political constituency and rights which could only rarely
command a legislative majority. Economic concerns of the sort the Court had addressed in its
due process heyday were an illustration of the former. The then nascent individual rights of
minority groups and persons accused of crime seem to fit the latter. While the present-day
distinction between property interests and life/liberty interests, which gives greater protection
to life/liberty interests, is consistent with Justice Stone's dichotomy, it may misrepresent the
rationale behind the dichotomy. For a further discussion of the relationship between prop-
erty and liberty, see Reich, supra, at 771-74.
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tion. As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath :7 "Fairness of procedure is 'due process in the
primary sense.' It is not a yardstick. It is a delicate process and ad-
justment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment . "..."48
Procedural due process is an attempt to individualize justice. It
accommodates the general interests of society to the individual needs
and limitations of the person affected, forbidding that which is un-
fair, indecent, or shocking to the conscience. Such notions seem to
work well in guaranteeing the fairness of the criminal justice system,
the principal field of the application of procedural due process. The
events relevant to the charged conduct have all taken place in the
past and will not change; no one is required to predict the future.
The standard of criminality is sharply drawn in most situations. The
questions of fact often are questions which average people can an-
swer routinely in their normal lives. The substantive issues are well
articulated and procedural protections ensure fairness. But similar
procedural protections cannot ensure fairness in guardianship pro-
ceedings. As In re Weingart poignantly demonstrates, such standards
leave untouched the fundamental unfairness inherent in guardian-
ship proceedings, the subordination of the ward's wishes to the judg-
ment of others.
Moreover, even if one could hope to approximate the ward's in-
tent through guardianship, the adjudication of incompetency simply
does not lend itself to precision through procedural protection. In
this section I discuss the two reasons why guardianship proceedings
do not lend themselves to procedural protection. First, the standards
used in guardianship proceedings, unlike those used in criminal tri-
als, cannot be defined. Second, the court in a guardianship proceed-
ing must predict the future, while the criminal justice system
examines events which have taken place in the past.
Problem of nebulous standards. The ambiguous standards of the sub-
stantive law in guardianship proceedings preclude effective applica-
tion of procedural due process analysis to guardianship proceedings.
In particular, the standard of what is an appropriate ability to man-
age property is unclear.49 Are persons who manage to meet the
47. 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
48. Id at 161, 163 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Justice Brandeis
noted in his dissent in Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), that "in the development
of our liberty insistence upon procedural regularity has been a large factor." Id. at 477.
49. "The problem of determining the kind of performance which represents good or
poor management is. . . easy at the extremes; in the middle ground no amount of scientific
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challenges of daily life with assistance from friends and family in-
competent because they could not do it alone? Are they incompetent
when they make decisions preventing the dissipation of their prop-
erty but are noticeably less effective than those who managed it
before? Are they incompetent if their property management skills
are marginal, irrespective of their prior abilities? What does the
word "properly" mean in the statutes relating to property manage-
ment? Do persons whose survival is not in question manage "im-
properly" if they fail to live up to standards the trial court finds
appropriate? How does the court decide on an appropriate stan-
dard?
The statutory standards seem to allow definitions of functional
ability ranging from simple improvidence in occasional transac-
tions50 to incapacity to provide for food or medical care for extended
periods of time. Since one can almost always find property managers
who can improve on a particular owner's management, it is unclear
when it becomes appropriate to impose such a manager on an un-
willing recipient.:
Problem of predicting the future. Even if the underlying standards
could be clarified, due process procedural protection must still fail to
ensure fairness. Guardianship laws necessarily attempt to predict fu-
ture conduct, in contrast to those areas of law concerned with prior
events, where the due process approach has been successful. For ex-
ample, in the typical criminal trial the central question is whether
the defendant committed a specific criminal act. As difficult as it
may be to reconstruct the past, it is far easier than predicting the
future. While the law generally prohibits the state from setting stan-
evidence will be helpful. It is a question of what kinds of performance 'count' as good man-
agement or poor management, and this is a matter of personal taste since the rules of lan-
guage are flexible enough to allow either judgment in the middle area." Leifer, The Competence
ofthe Psychiatrist to Assist in the Determination of Incompeteng: A Skeptical Inquigy Into the Courtroom
Functions of Psychiatrists, 14 SYRACuSE L. REv. 564, 567 (1963).
50. See Note, supra note 33, at 682-83.
51. This inherent problem is further exacerbated by the needlessly ambiguous language
found in many of the present guardianship statutes. The "artful and designing" person stan-
dard is a prime example of such a statute. Because Mr. Weingart and Ms. Winston were not
married, she can be described as an "artful and designing" person. Viewed from that per-
spective, the question becomes less one of the sincerity of his intentions to support the rela-
tionship, and more one of his ability to resist it. What might in other circumstances be
described as Mr. Weingart's love, making him want to be near her and to provide for her,
becomes his inability to resist her and a statutory reason for guardianship. The needlessness
of the "artful and designing" person standard is illustrated by California's rejection of this
standard in 1976. See note-21 supra.
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dards of criminality that depend on the prediction of future behav-
ior,5 2 the focus in guardianship is necessarily prospective. The court is
instructed to discern how the potential ward would manage without
a guardian. Prior acts provide the basis for initiating proceedings
and assist in the prognostication, but the important question is how
the respondent will behave after the hearing.
Courts often rely on experts, at least in cases warranting the
expense, to help make predictions of future conduct. Physicians (es-
pecially psychiatrists) and psychologists often testify. The great
weight given to expert testimony introduced by a party when the
issues in question are relatively precise has been frequently criti-
cized.53 When, as in guardianship, the issues are hard to define, the
influence of experts is probably magnified. Moreover, it is unclear
that a scientific basis for prediction exists. Empirical studies demon-
strate substantial prediction failures.' For example, experts have
frequently overapplied diagnoses of irreversible chronic brain syn-
drome.55 A recent review of expert testimony about future danger-
ousness casts grave doubts on the predictive ability of these experts.56
There is no reason to believe that experts can better predict the abil-
ity to manage property in the future.
Certainly greater procedural protection may reduce the likeli-
hood of improper adjudication of incompetency. Yet even with the
greatest possible procedural protection, the adjudication of incompe-
tency may still be inaccurate. And, if inaccurate, great unfairness is
possible under guardianship, where the ward's wishes are so easily
lost in the fray. Since present guardianship law cannot be declared
52. "In both [criminal confinement and civil commitment] cases the state decides that
society at large will benefit from deprivation of the individual's liberty. But criminal impris-
onment normally is imposed only after a defendant has committed or attempted a dangerous
act. If a sociologist predicted that a person was eighty per cent likely to commit a felonious
act, no law would permit his confinement." Note, Civil Commitment of the Mental Ill Theories
andProcedures, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1288, 1289-90 (1966).
53. Recent articles have pointed to the problems arising from the use of partisan ex-
perts, whose viewpoints are established in response to "pecuniary stimulus." See, e.g., Moen-
ssens, The 'Impartial' Medical Expert: A New Look at an Old Issue, 25 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 63
(1978); Molinari, The Role of the Expert Witness, 9 FORUM 789 (1974). Often the finder of fact
may simply be determining which party has the better experts. Moenssens, supra, at 65-66;
Molinari, supra, at 791.
54. See Ennis & Litwak, Psychiatly and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 711-16 (1974); Morse, supra note 25, at 595-99.
55. See Alexander, supra note 38, at 1096; Regan, supra note 15, at 577-79, 590-91. See
also Horstman, supra note 15, at 275 & n.269.
56. Ennis & Litwak, supra note 54, at 711-16.
57. Morse, supra note 25, at 596.
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unconstitutional, and since its failings cannot be cured by a procedu-
ral approach, a more radical restructuring by the legislature is
needed. In the next section I examine probate law as a possible sub-
stitute for guardianship proceedings.
C. The Probate Model- Substitution of a Living W/llfor Guardianship
Proceedings
Guardianship proceedings brought by members of the family
against an elderly parent or spouse often look superficially like pro-
bate proceedings. The judge very often is a probate judge, and the
participants in the proceedings tend to introduce evidence of a fail-
ure to properly provide for them as an indication of fiscal misman-
agement. But since the ward is still alive probate would be
premature. If the issue were posed as a question of traditional inheri-
tance, much of the controversy would be quickly resolved either by
the presence of a will or by intestate succession. In this section I con-
trast probate law with present guardianship law, and suggest how the
legislature could use probate law as the basis for authorizing creation
of a "living will"-a document which would allow individuals to di-
rect the management of their property in case of future incompe-
tence. If adjudicating incompetency must inevitably be inexact, we
can at least ensure that in all cases the wishes of the ward are para-
mount and explicit.
1. Formalities ofpirobate as advancing the testator's intent.
Certainty of result is a significant, if not the primary, feature of
the law of inheritance. Consequently, fixed rules are commonplace
and tend to apply even in the face of countervailing considerations of
fairness. For example, in Estate of Moore,;8 the California Court of
Appeals invalidated a will which had been signed at the beginning
rather than at the end, although the will complied with all other
statutory requirements. There was no question that the document
was the decedent's will, yet the court refused to allow it into probate.
The court recognized the probable specific unfairness to the dece-
dent's estate, but relied on a broader view of justice, noting that
when they are strictly construed, "statutes in the long run promote
justice-which is their sole object-by shutting out opportunities of
fraud. When they defeat one honest purpose they prevent unnum-
bered frauds, which in their absence would be feasible and measura-
58. 92 Cal. App. 2d 120, 206 P.2d 413 (3d Dist. 1949).
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bly safe. ' 5 9  It is easy to find similar examples in the law of
formalities which when disobeyed apparently thwart a drafter's in-
tent in the interest of avoiding fraud.6 °
Although insistence on correct form appears at first to thwart the
accomplishment of a property owner's wishes, the purpose of that
insistence may actually be the opposite. By providing for a certain
result, such rules enable those willing to take the trouble to adopt the
proper form to be certain about the outcome of their actions. The
formality prevents competing claims of unfairness from becoming is-
sues. If form were not so important, courts would continuously be
confronted with the invitation to balance countervailing interests
against the precision of the property owner's statement of intent. But
instead a court can reject a document when improperly expressed-
however "unfair" that rejection may be-and accept a property own-
er's statement made in the proper form-however "unfair" its dispo-
sition of property may be. In that light, one can understand the
court's decision in Estate of Moore, even if the "unfairness" in that case
is extreme. Ironically, individual fairness is better effected by rules
leading to certain outcomes than by individual adjudication.
2. Application ofprobate law to guardianship: the living will.
Probate may be an appropriate model for the disposition of prop-
erty belonging to allegedly incompetent individuals. Legislatures
have already committed similar issues involving events after death or
incapacity to will-like processes. For example, it is now possible, in
some states, to donate one's body, or parts of one's body, upon
death.6" Some jurisdictions also recognize written declarations di-
recting that life-sustaining techniques be abandoned when death is
inevitable.62 Further still from the point of death, some states allow
59. Id at 124, 206 P.2d at 415; accord, Estate of Seaman, 146 Cal. 455, 462-63, 80 P. 700,
702-03 (1905).
60. The Statute of Frauds, which requires that a broad range of contracts be in writing,
is one such doctrine outside of probate law. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-206, 2-201; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178-224 (1973). Other examples include recording statutes, see,
e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1169-1218 (West 1954 & Supp. 1979), and the requirement that
deeds be delivered by the grantor to the grantee, R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
896 (rev. ed. 1979). Perhaps the most colorful example was the common law method of
conveyancing by feoffment with livery of seisin, whereby the parties to a transaction would
call together a jury of neighbors and in their presence exchange a twig or clod of dirt to
evidence the transfer of title. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 82-83 (2d ed. 1898).
61. The model statute is the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 7150-7157 (West 1970 & Supp. 1979).
62. See, e.g., id §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1979) (California Natural Death Act).
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individuals to file a will-like document nominating a guardian,
should there ever be a need to appoint one.63 A similar device is the
power of attorney, which delegates authority for specified acts to
named persons; 4 the delegation survives later incompetency of the
maker in states which have authorized such instruments. All such
statutes leave discretion with the court to choose a guardian, but they
allow a person to take responsibility by proposing an arrangement
for a fiscal caretaker, should one be required in the future.65 If a
similar device existed by which those now alleged to be incompetent
could have recorded-their wishes concerning the disposition of their
property while they were competent, courts might be spared the type
of fraud which the court in Estate of Moore said it avoided,66 but
which is certainly possible in today's guardianship proceedings.
Contrast between probate and guardianship. The contrast between pro-
bate and present guardianship law is great. First, the intent of a
ward is less likely to be followed than is the intent of a decedent. A
decedent's previously expressed wishes control the distribution of the
estate in probate, except to the extent that there are interests legally
enforceable by others against the estate.67 But while guardianship
also purports to effectuate the true wishes of the ward,6 the ward's
wishes are not necessarily heeded in practice.6 9 Second, probate and
guardianship also differ because death prevents decedents from en-
joying their property, while the law prevents wards from enjoying
theirs. Third, in a probate proceeding, those who contest the will do
63. See Regan, supra note 15, at 616.
64. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-501; Lombard, Miller, Gother & Houghton, Legal
Problems of the Agedandlnfrm-The Durable Power ofAllomq, 13 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 1,
2-11 (1978).
65. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1463 (West Supp. 1979).
66. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
67. Both individuals and entities not named in a will can make claims against a dece-
dent's estate. Creditors' claims receive high priority in distribution and a wide range of pro-
cedural safeguards. See, e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-605, -607, -801 to -816, -909,
-1004,6-107. Government claims to estate and inheritance taxes are protected, see, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 2001; CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE §§ 13401, 13601 (West 1970), and the testator's family is
protected through such devices as homesteads, exemptions, and allowances, see, e.g., UNI-
FORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-401 to -403.
68. For example, guardianship provisions protecting wards from "artful and designing"
persons ostensibly protect the ward's true wishes by eliminating undue influence. See notes
36-38 supra and accompanying text.
69. Under UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-424, for example, the conservator is given
broad powers to manage the property, subject only to the rare need for court approval. There
is no check by the incompetent on the power of the conservator.
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so openly, as adversaries. 70  In guardianship proceedings, however,
their interests may be hidden behind their roles as petitioners. Fi-
nally, third parties cannot generally question the propriety of the dis-
tribution of a decedent's estate unless they claim a statutory interest.
But in guardianship, "wasteful" earlier distributions can become a
principal reason for the declaration of incompetency and for thwart-
ing the ward's intent.
The main difference between probate law and guardianship law,
and the principal advantage of probate law, is that while guardian-
ship does not necessarily follow a ward's intent, probate courts sel-
dom interfere with a testator's wishes for property disposition. As we
have seen, a primary principle of probate law is to follow the testa-
tor's stated intention.7' Wills pass property from the estate to benefi-
ciaries selected by the decedent. Assuming competency to make a
will, 72 a testator is free to exercise sound judgment or whim. Except
in limited circumstances, 73 a court will not review the property dispo-
sition for fairness, or to substitute the court's judgment for that of the
testator.74 Third parties who believe that they should have been pre-
ferred to those named in the will are not allowed to contest the
court's distribution.75
Probate and the living will. The advantages and disadvantages of
allowing a probate-like prior determination to control the manage-
ment of property are similar to those of allowing wills to control the
70. Under most modem statutes, the administrator's role resembles that of the defend-
ant in a collection action. See, e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-801 to -816.
71. This is the basic rule of construction in interpreting wills. Se UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE § 2-603.
72. See notes 88-90 infra and accompanying text.
73. For an explanation of those instances in which courts deviate from the terms of a
will, see note 67 .upra and accompanying text.
74. Even in the absence of a written document, the law prefers not to give courts discre-
tion in the distribution of a decedent's property. Intestacy law provides mechanical formulae
for the apportionment of property where a decedent did not leave a will meeting statutory
criteria, and courts do not undertake to adjust these formulae in light of what might appear
to be fair under the circumstances. See, e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-101 to -113 (in-
testacy provisions). An intestacy statute is the legislature's determination of what is generally
fair. In order to reduce litigation and promote judicial economy, this standard is imposed
even in the cases where, because of unusual circumstances, inequities result.
75. But the right to pass property by will in a relatively unfettered manner is not unlim-
ited; the state regulates the process in several ways. For example, it provides that interests
may be claimed "against the will" because of a desire to protect certain types of people from
the testator's total discretion. See note 67 .supra. Also, legal claims against the decedent may
generally be collected from the estate. Id Beyond such limits, however, the testator's choice
controls.
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distribution of property after death. There is, of course, the opportu-
nity for improvidence. Even so, one knows that the disposition was
determined by the person most able to understand appropriate uses
of the ward's wealth and the ward's possible needs for management
help-the ward's prior self. The ward's written directions would
bind the surrogate manager appointed by the living will, or if the
instrument were silent on a particular point, the surrogate would act
as he or she believed the incompetent would have intended. Incom-
petents would have had an opportunity to spell out such concerns in
whatever detail they deemed appropriate at an earlier point in life.
In common with a decedent, the incompetent may have legal ob-
ligations to others. Present probate laws may be useful in determin-
ing these obligations. For example, it is clear that creditors may
bring claims against a debtor's estate.16 Similarly, spouses have
claims to the estate, whether by way of community property or
through an elective share.77 The state exacts taxes, which may be
claims against the estate. 8 Probate laws protect other interests by
giving homestead exemptions to surviving spouses or dependent chil-
dren,79 providing spouses and minor children with family al-
lowances,80 and granting property allowance exemptions generally,
which preserve property for spouses and children in preference to
other beneficiaries.81
If the law allowed individuals to prepare living wills directing the
course of their possible future guardianships, then statutes could al-
low overriding claims to be met as they presently are met by probate
law. For example, if a husband made no provision for his wife dur-
ing his guardianship, the state would direct that the guardian sup-
port her. In addition, the continuing needs of the ward might
necessitate claims by the ward on others; it might be desirable for a
statute to recognize a parent's claim for emergency medical funds
from children. In any event, the legislature has ample precedents
should it ever choose to recognize claims against living wills which
are not presently allowed against decedents' wills.
Further, the living will might significantly reduce adjudicated in-
competence. Statistics are difficult to find, but anecdotes indicate
that incompetency proceedings are sometimes improperly used to ad-
76. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-801 to -816.
77. Id §§ 2-201 to -207.
78. See I.R.C. § 2001; CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE §§ 13401, 13601 (West 1970).
79. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-401.
80. Id § 2-403.
81. Id § 2-402.
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just property concerns among competing claimants. In re Weingart is
a case in point. The debts of the conservators and Mr. Weingart's
generosity to his roommate were fundamentally altered. It seems
possible that if individuals were unable to benefit from a determina-
tion of incompetence, they would be less likely to bring such proceed-
ings. Perhaps living wills would shift the concern in incompetency
proceedings from control of property to the welfare of the alleged
incompetent, a type of case which the apparently self-serving nature
of present guardianship proceedings brought by members of the fam-
ily may actually inhibit. At the very least, the living will would re-
duce the grievous potential for abuse caused by the inevitably
imprecise adjudication of incompetency.
D. Creating and Enforcing a Living Will
The "living will" suggested by this article would direct the course
of the testator's guardianship, should such a guardianship become
necessary. Enforcement of living wills would hinge on meeting for-
malities similar to those used in the law of decedents' wills. If the
formalities were met, the testator would be certain that the wishes
expressed in the living will would be followed. The need to meet a
set of formal requirements would usually promote reliance on profes-
sional help to write the living will, because of the complexity of com-
peting concerns in arranging a possible future guardianship. This
section examines the creation and enforcement of a living will.
1. Formalities.
Many questions which would otherwise plague the interpretation
of living wills, such as the requisite formalities or rules of interpreta-
tion, can be satisfied by reference to the law of wills. As we have
seen, the law of wills provides a good guide to forced shares of the
estate when spousal shares and benefits to pretermitted children and
spouses are at issue.83 For instance, just as the surviving spouse is
entitled to a share of the decedent's estate, the ward's mate should be
able to keep part of the ward's property even if the living will pro-
vides otherwise. However, if the testator's statutory duty of support 84
82. See notes 8, 13-14 supra and accompanying texts.
83. Se notes 77, 79-81 supra and accompanying texts.
84. Statutes often impose upon certain family members the duty to support specified
kin. For example, a parent must support minor children, CAL. CIV. CODE § 196 (West Supp.
1979), and, in certain circumstances, a child must support needy parents, id § 206. See gener-
ally id §§ 241-254 (imposing civil liability for such support); id § 246 (establishing criteria
for amount of support due).
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exceeds the income from the forced share, the greater obligation
seems appropriate, since it is the amount that would be due from the
ward if competent.
But while the maker of a living will may be directly affected by
the instrument's provisions, decedents derive no personal benefit
from the carrying out of their wills' directions. The maker of a living
will, therefore, has a different concern about that instrument than
does the testator of a will effective only at death. Consequently, the
formalities required for living wills should deviate from those applied
to decedents' wills. First, makers of living wills should be encouraged
to file them with a public authority, and the act of filing should pro-
vide legally binding notice to those who might wish to contest the
document. Second, a process should be established to permit indi-
viduals to challenge living wills before they become operative. This
would allow concerned persons to protest what they considered to be
undue influence or overreaching which might indicate functional de-
bility; it would also help to establish that the will was competently
made, if no challenge occurred for a substantial time after the will's
execution and filing.
8 5
A concern for privacy dictates that only the fact of filing, and not
the content of the living will, be made public. Family harmony
might suffer from greater disclosure, and few testators would wel-
come the pressures brought to bear by those with contrary views urg-
ing modification of the living will. 6 However, since the proposed
dispositions might indicate confusion or other functional lapses, in
extraordinary cases courts should have the power to permit inspec-
tion of the document by others, after in camera review. Modification
and revocation would be required to meet the filing requirements
and the principles of the law of decedents' wills.
85. Adoption of the insurance concept of incontestability might also be desirable. The
law presumes that the holder of a life insurance policy did not intend to defraud the insurer
by committing suicide, if5 or more years passed between the initial signing of the policy and
the suicide. Similarly, the law might provide that if a person executes a document and is not
declared incompetent within a certain period from the date of execution, the competency of
the person would be incontestable for purposes of effecting the document. Such a rule would
certainly entail some risk, as it does when used in insurance policies. But it would both isiti-
gate the difficulty of establishing prior competence and further the goal of allowing personal
responsibility. Also, it would avoid a good deal of litigation and promote relative certainty of
result.
86. In re Weingart, No. P-607498 (Super. Ct. Prob. Div. L.A. County, Cal. Oct. 29,
1974), is a case in point.
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2. Discretion of the guardian.
The living will need not dispose of all the testator's property. It
could provide, for example, that certain family members were to con-
tinue an existing business, manage the stock portfolio, or the like. It
could provide for or against support of children in enterprises they
might undertake. It might specify the support of loved ones. It could
forbid the sale by the guardian of certain assets particularly impor-
tant to the maker. It could name those to be given management
roles and those to be excluded, or it could specify only limited man-
agement roles for certain individuals.
But however detailed the living will, it must leave many issues
unresolved.8 7 Much discretion will necessarily pass to the guardian;
a provision nominating an appropriate list of alternative guardians is
probably equally crucial to avoid the naming of a possibly undesir-
able guardian by the court. Given the specific directions of other
provisions, the surrogates would be free to fill in what they assumed
to be the maker's intention.
3. Challenges to the living will.
Third parties might challenge the living will, as they can a dece-
dent's will, on the grounds that the testator was incompetent or
under undue influence when the instrument was executed. Such
challenges to a living will, however, should be as generally unsuccess-
ful as they are when made to decedents' wills.
The law requires that to be valid a will must be executed while
the maker is competent. Although one might argue that a testator's
self-doubts about competency at the time of execution might be the
motive for making a living will, the mere act of making a living will
should not generally lead to a court finding the maker incompetent.
Rather the test of competence for a living will should be as it is in the
law of probate. The test of competence used there is sufficient age,
the ability to understand the nature of one's acts, the ability to recol-
lect and understand the nature and location of one's property, and
the ability to remember and understand one's relations to the persons
who have claims upon the testator's bounty and whose interests are
87. Management of one's estate is probably so unique that model wills would be of little
use, since it is far more complicated to continue one's affairs than to distribute the wealth they
represent. Indeed, the use of a model form is fundamentally inconsistent with the idea of
persons taking responsibility for themselves and would likely lead to the types of abuses in the
present system.
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affected by the will.88 Challenges to the probate of wills on the
ground of incompetency of the maker are rarely successful.89 The
passage of time since making the document generally suffices to indi-
cate that the maker was competent at the time when the instrument
was executed. "[I]solated acts, foibles, idiosyncrasies, moral and
mental irregularities or departures from the normal" by themselves
are insufficient to show incompetency. 90 Similarly generous treat-
ment should be given to living wills, so that the property owner's
wishes will be followed.
Third parties might also contend that the maker of the instru-
ment, although otherwise functioning adequately, has fallen under
undue influence, and that the living will therefore should be disre-
garded. The availability of living wills would motivate those con-
cerned about undue influence to challenge the instruments when
made, much as they may presently institute proceedings for guardi-
anship or challenge improvidently made gifts. Their failure to chal-
lenge the living will soon after its execution should also be probative
of the competence of its maker.
Courts should apply the doctrine of substituted judgment 9 -an
attempt to determine what the ward would wish if competent-when
third parties question the competency of the maker of a living will,
just as courts apply the doctrine to similar cases involving decedents'
wills. In my opinion the use of the doctrine of substituted judgment
is preferable to disregarding a person's wishes altogether, although it
shares with the current unsatisfactory law of incompetency the un-
certain benevolence of deciding what is in the best interest of some-
one else. Nonetheless, substituted judgment is better than total
disregard of the ward's intent. The terms of a living will could direct
decisions about substituted judgment even though that document
would be denied direct effect.
88. Eg., Estate of Smith, 200 Cal. 152, 158, 252 P. 325, 328 (1926); T. ATKINSON,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 51 (2d ed. 1953); Note, Pychiatric Assistance in the Deter-
mination of Testamentagr Capacity, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1116, 1116-17 (1953).
89. "[A]n examination of the [California] cases discloses comparatively few in which the
attack on the ground of incompetency was successful." 7 B. WrryaN, SUMMARY OF CALIFOR-
NIA LAW Wills and Probate, § 99, at 5616 (8th ed. 1974).
90. Estate of Wright, 7 Cal. 2d 348, 356, 60 P.2d 434, 438 (1936).
91. The doctrine and its philosophical rationale are discussed in Robertson, Organ Dona-
tions by Incompetents and the SubstitutedJudgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 48, 57-68 (1976).
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II. THE LIVING WILL AND SURROGATE MANAGEMENT OF
HEALTH NEEDS
This article has concerned itself principally with the disposition of
an elderly person's wealth. Guardianships are available for the sur-
rogate management of an elderly person's health needs as well. As a
form of involuntary intervention, such "protective" services of all
sorts have frightening potential. While comparative data is not
available, one would suppose that wards perceive guardianships of
their persons, especially those resulting in hospitalization, as greater
invasions of personal autonomy than guardianships of their estates.
Whether or not this conjecture is true, empirical evidence suggests
that involuntary hospitalization may be lethal.92 The Benjamin
Rose Institute, in a study of the effectiveness of protective services,
compared an involuntarily hospitalized group with a control group
to determine, among other things, how much longer involuntarily
hospitalized patients lived. Its findings indicated that the involunta-
rily hospitalized group died sooner than the control group.9 3 The
study noted the generally recognized belief that people, especially the
elderly, resent forced relocation, and that involuntary hospitalization
creates very high levels of anxiety.94
In this part I examine the legitimacy of the grounds used to invol-
untarily commit elderly persons for health reasons, and I discuss how
a living will might allow individuals to determine the nature of their
health care after they have become incompetent.
A. Grounds for Involuntary Commitment
The decision whether involuntary intervention is necessary to
provide medical care is generally made under standards quite similar
to, or identical with, those used for property management. 95 Conse-
quently, the vagaries that attend guardianship determinations for
property management plague determinations for health care as
well.96 The distortion caused by expert testimony is increased, since
the testimony of physicians about the ward's need for care appears
far more clearly to fall within their expertise, and is therefore proba-
92. See Blenker, Environmental Change and the Aging Individual, 7 GERONTOLOGIST 101
(1967); Gottesman, The Response of Long-Hospitalized Aged Pychiatric Patients to Milieu Treatment,
7 GERONTOLOGIST 47 (1967).
93. BENJAMIN ROSE INSTITUTE, PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR OLDER PEOPLE: FIND-
INGS FROM THE BENJAMIN ROSE INSTITUTE STUDY (1974).
94. Id
95. G. ALEXANDER & T. LEWIN, supra note 4, at 81-96.
96. See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text.
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bly given greater weight by the court than is a medical prediction of
fiscal improvidence. Although testimony as to the health care which
can be provided a ward does lie within medical expertise, the ques-
tion of whether involuntary intervention is needed to provide treat-
ment raises the same problems of prediction that exist in property
management cases. 97 Since courts have difficulty distinguishing be-
tween the issues, they give excessive weight to medical testimonyf8
If a guardian is appointed, the health care the guardian provides
the ward may vary from simply furnishing nutritional needs and oc-
casional medicine, to having the ward involuntarily committed to an
institution. The interests protected by the guardian's intervention
are a bit more complex than those protected in the property cases. In
addition to protecting wards from their own improvidential inability
to provide for their needs-the best interest standard-there may be
a specific concern that the wards not commit suicide or harm others.
While guardianship laws do not expressly impose these concerns on
the guardian, civil commitment law reflects the societal interest in all
three by recognizing them as grounds for commitment.9 9 In this sec-
tion I consider the legitimacy of involuntarily committing elderly
persons because they are dangerous to others or to themselves-
grounds that complicate this article's consideration of a ward's self-
determination because they introduce significant claims by others.
1. Dangerousness to others.
The most clearly legitimate claim by third parties is that the
ward may be dangerous to others.' 00 Persons committed because
they are considered dangerous owe their commitment at least in
part to public safety considerations. This type of commitment, how-
ever, has been under strong attack recently.'0 ' Commentators have
pointed out that psychiatrists forced to confront the prospect of possi-
ble violence from an unrestrained patient have a strong motivation
to predict dangerousness, thus obtaining the safety of the patient's
incarceration in a neutral hospital.1 2 While doubts about the relia-
97. See notes 52-57 supra and accompanying text.
98. See Schulman, To Be or Not To Be an Expert, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 57, 63; Wexler &
Scoville, The Administration ofPyschiatricjustice: Theo.7 and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARIZ. L. REv.
1, 60-61 (1971).
99. See Civil Commitment, supra note 40, at 1201-07; Note, supra note 52, at 1289-97.
100. See Civil Commitment, supra note 40, at 1201-07; Note, supra note 52, at 1289-93.
101. See Ennis & Litwak, supra note 54.
102. See, e.g., Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist5l Power in Civil Commitment- A Knife that Cuts
Both Ways, PSYCH. TODAY, Feb. 1969, at 43, 47.
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bility of psychiatric testimony do not alter the state's concern for
public safety, the doubts certainly suggest that involuntary commit-
ment may be an overreaction.
Moreover, hospitalization because of feared future dangerousness
is similar to criminal preventive detention (incarceration because of
feared future criminality). But a belief that a person may be danger-
ous in the future is not an acceptable ground for criminal punish-
ment. 0 3 A therapeutic approach does not help legitimate the state's
claim in the civil area, since dangerousness is not an illness and a
dangerous person may not be "treatable." By incarcerating persons
thought to be dangerous, the state fills mental hospitals with persons
detained for the public welfare without regard to whether they can
benefit from treatment.1
0 4
Further, the confusion of interests on this issue has led to the
anomaly of laws such as California's Lanterman-Petris-Short Act,
10 5
in which "legal" officials select persons for the mental health estab-
lishment and physicians must "diagnose" their dangerousness.' 0 6
The initial decision to treat rather than prosecute is made by a le-
gally trained person who initiates the mental health review, and phy-
sicians are then asked to determine whether a person is dangerous.
In other words, the treatment decision is made by people trained in
the law; the question of criminality is left to physicians.
Because of these problems and others, commitment for danger-
ousness to others is falling into disrepute. Recent interdisciplinary
studies, such as that made by the California Bar's Commission on
Law and Mental Health Problems, have concluded that danger to
others is not a legitimate ground for civil commitment. 0 7 The state's
interest in the protection of the public can be satisfied by the more
traditional process of the criminal law.
2. Dangerousness to self.
The societal concern about suicide0 raises slightly different is-
sues. The evidence which demonstrates that psychiatrists cannot reli-
ably predict when individuals are dangerous to others does not
103. See note 52 supra.
104. Cal. Bar Comm'n, Report on Law and Mental Health Problems (1979) (on file
with author) [hereinafter cited as Cal. Bar Comm'n Report].
105. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5404.1 (West 1972 & Supp. 1979).
106. Id § 5150 (West Supp. 1979).
107. See Cal. Bar Comm'n Report, supra note 104. Candor requires the author to dis-
close that he was a member of the Commission.
108. Civil Commitment, supra note 40, at 1201-07; Note, supra note 52, at 1293-95.
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expressly address the ability of psychiatrists to predict danger to self,
though one would suppose that the two are closely linked. In any
event, there is a dearth of studies demonstrating the reliability of psy-
chiatric predictions of suicide. Some insight into this form of psychi-
atric prediction is provided by the change in California law after the
adoption of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act.'0 9 Prior to this Act, pa-
tients thought to be suicidal could be involuntarily incarcerated until
rehabilitated. Under the Act, after an emergency 72-hour period,"0
initial involuntary commitment is limited to 30 days; thereafter legal
process is required for further incarceration."' A followup study of
the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act demonstrated that recertification
was very infrequently sought' 12 and patients were routinely released.
Nonetheless, the study found no suicides among the released
group.113  This limited data suggests that involuntary hospitaliza-
tion--certainly long term involuntary commitment-was unnecessary
to achieve the societal goal of preventing suicide.
Moreover, society's concern about suicide is inconsistent with its
ambivalence to other acts proven to be dangerous, though not imme-
diately lethal, to individuals. For example, smoking, publicly con-
demned as lethal," 4 is not illegal. Similarly, saccharin is generally
available despite some concern that it might be a carcinogen.-' It is
true that persons are generally free to choose to receive medical care
or to reject it." 6 Such choices are routinely afforded in the interest of
individual freedom.
Further, while the state may have an interest in preventing death,
individuals have a strong philosophical claim to determine their
longevity. Some have asserted a categorical right to die." 7 Many
have asserted such a right under limited circumstances, as is seenin a
number of statutes permitting persons to direct termination of life
109. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5404.1 (West 1972 & Supp. 1979).
110. Id § 5151 (West Supp. 1979).
111. Id § 5254 (West 1972).
112. See ENKI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW MENTAL
HEALTH LAW 152 (1972).
113. See id
114. See The Smoking Report, SCIENTIFIC AM., Feb. 1964, at 66.
115. See general.' Batzinger, Ou & Bueding, Saccharin and Other Sweeteners: Autagenic
Properties, 198 Sci. 944 (1977); Bryan, Ertfirk & Yoshida, Production of Uinag, Bladder Card-
nomas in Mice by Sodium Saccharin, 168 Sci. 1238 (1970).
116. See Byrn, Compulsog, Lifesaving Treatmentfor the Competent Adult, 44 FORDHAN L.
REV. 1 (1975); Note, Suicide and the Compulsion ofLifesaving Medical Procedures An Anal'sis of the
Refusal of Treatment Cases, 44 BROOKLYN L. REv. 285 (1978); Comment, Informed Consent to
Immunization. The Risks and Benetr of Individual Autonomy, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1286 (1977).
117. Brecher, Optingfor Suicide, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1979, § 6 (Magazine), at 72.
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support systems after hope of recovery passes." 8 The California
Bar's Commission on Law and Mental Health Problems rejected the
danger of suicide as a legitimate reason for involuntary in-
carceration." 9
Yet the state may argue that in committing an individual to pre-
vent suicide, it acts on the "true" wishes of that individual: In re-
sponse to committed patients' claims of autonomy, the state might
counter that the patients would have wished intervention but-for
their illnesses. If the only rationale for intervention in such cases is
the "true" intent of the patient, and if only this justification is consis-
tent with society's belief in personal autonomy, then greater effort
should be made to discover this intent. A document executed prior
to the onset of mental illness, specifying whether the patient actually
wanted intervention, should determine whether the patient is com-
mitted. In the next section I explore how the living will might serve
as such a document.
B. Using the Living Will
A living will competently executed should determine whether a
ward can be given treatment involuntarily. Through a living will,
wards can, while competent, decide whether treatment is in their best
interest. Under the standard approved by the California Bar's Com-
mission on Law and Mental Health Problems as the only legitimate
standard for involuntary intervention,120 physicians are asked to ad-
dress the treatability of emotional conditions affecting patients,
rather than to predict or treat future dangerousness to self or others.
Since a knowledge of a patient's competently made treatment deci-
sion is necessary to treat that patient,121 the living will could, by fur-
nishing this knowledge, determine whether treatment would be
supplied. Living wills might also provide advance consent to treat-
118. Horan, The 'Right to Die'" Legislative and Judicial Developments, 13 FORUM 488
(1978); Note, The Legal Aspects of the Right to Die: Before and After the Quinlan Decision, 65 KY.
LJ. 823 (1977); Comment, The Living Will- Already a PracticalAlternative, 55 TEX. L. REV. 665
(1977); Comment, North Carolina's Natural Death Act: Confronting Death with Dignity, 14 WAKF
FOREST L. REv. 771 (1978). The highly respected California Poll recently reported that
Californians approve of passive euthanasia by an eight to one margin, and that active eutha-
nasia was approved by better than a two to one margin. Field, Califomians More Liberalthan the
New Law About Right to Die, San Jose Mercury, Apr. 25, 1979, § C, at 25, col. 1.
119. See Cal. Bar Comm'n Report, supra note 104.
120. Id
121. The patient's informed consent to treatment, where it can be obtained, is a neces-
sary prerequisite to medical action. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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ment by those who would fear jeopardizing their status or em-
ployment through irrational acts more than they would fear the
hospitalization designed to cure them. These individuals would file
documents to short-cut admission procedures and to facilitate early
treatment. 122
The practical considerations making living wills difficult as in-
struments ofproperp management are dwarfed by the difficulties of
attempting to delimit future medical intervention. Forms of treat-
ment change radically from time to time. The quality of institutions
and forms of therapy change as well. It is likely that only categorical
consent or refusal of any sort of treatment in the living will could
withstand the changes brought by time. Nonetheless, some benefits
can be obtained through a less-than-comprehensive instrument. For
example, some people may particularly fear electroconvulsive ther-
apy,123 and wish specifically to provide against its administration.
Similarly, psychotropic drugs may be anathema to some. Psycho-
surgery may be particularly unattractive to some but attractive to
others. Some may wish to limit the length of involuntary treatment,
providing, for example, that involuntary hospitalization should be
limited to 3 months whatever its form, or to express a preference for a
certain facility if available or a predilection against another.
The importance of the ability to file a binding document control-
ling future medical intervention is that it transfers control back to the
individual and thus relieves possible anxiety about being overpow-
ered when growing old. That the instrument would likely be incom-
plete, failing to consider all possible alternatives or to reflect
advances in medical treatment, should not be as significant as the
capacity the instrument gives to people to be responsible for them-
selves.
III. CONCLUSION
Adoption of the legislation necessary for living wills would, of
course, be experimental. A large number of people would not exe-
cute the required documents. Those who did not execute living wills
would not be affected by the change in the law; the small number of
people initially taking advantage of the statute would allow legisla-
122. The living will would, of course, only govern the ward's treatment and would not
prevent the state from applying criminal process to interdict dangerous acts performed by the
maker.
123. SeeJ. FRIEDBERG, SHOCK TREATMENT Is NOT GOOD FOR YOUR BRAIN (1976); A
SCHEFLIN & E. OPTON, THE, MIND MANIPULATORS 354-402 (1978).
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tive monitoring of the results. Possibly the management schemes
provided in some living wills may prove to be unfair to children, par-
ents, spouses, or others. Yet this is equally true of wills. The poten-
tial unfairness of wills is outweighed by the importance of providing
for individual choice; the same seems true for the living will.
The principal advantage of the living will proposal is that it
places the question of what to do with the property and health of a
living human being whose judgment can no longer be trusted in the
hands of the one person who will surely deal with the problem with
the best interests of the incompetent in mind: the individual's prior
self. It will at least remove from the judicial process the spectacle of
cases in which avarice controls and wards are deprived of their prop-
erty in the name of benevolence. It will remove doubt as to the most
appropriate disposition of property and thus relieve courts and rela-
tives of the burden which they now face in trying to determine the
best interests of the ward. It will certainly provide a perceived bene-
fit to those who fear that they will be overwhelmed when they grow
old by others who will take control of their lives. The right to deter-
mine the future course of health care and the use of possessions would
add an important element to the right of individuals to be responsi-
ble for themselves.
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